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NOTES
A SINGLE ACT STATUTE FOR NORTH DAKOTA
North Dakota is without a Single Act statute per se. This analy-
sis of the Single Act statutes of Illinois, Wisconsin, and Minnesota
will relate those statutes to what North Dakota has and needs.
The aspects of the Single Act statutes that will be presented are the
tort and contract provisions, which generally call for the trans-
action of business or the commission of a tort within the state.
Originally no personal judgment action could be maintained
against a foreign corporation without its consent because a corpora-
tion could have no legal existence outside the boundaries of the
state of incorporation.' This early concept was rejected as incon-
sistent with modern needs and was replaced with the consent doctrine.
Consent to be sued in the courts of the forum state was required
of a foreign corporation if it was to do business in that state. Con-
sent was none the less effective because coerced. 2 But the foreign
corporation might refuse to give its consent in this matter, and
in the face of such difficulties that arose with the consent theory
the idea of corporate presence was formulated.8
The problem of subjecting foreign corporations, which were do-
ing business in a state, and had not agreed by some explicit con-
sent to personal actions not connected with the business done in
the state, was not clearly answered by the old cases. Some early
cases held it was unconstitutional,4 but it is not clear if these de-
cisions were decided on the basis of statutory interpretation or con-
stitutional power This power over foreign corporations was upheld
in at least one case, however, where service of process was made
on a corporate official or agent.
5
The Commerce Clause further restricts the right of a state to
1. Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet) 519 (1839).
2. Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. of Philadelphia v. Gold Issue Mining and Milling Co.,
243 U.S. 93 (1917).
3. Philadelphia and Reading Ry. Co. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264 (1917).
4. Simon v. Southern Ry. Co., 236 U.S. 115 (1915). Old Wayne Mutual Life Ass'n v.
McDonough, 204 U.S. 8 (1907).
5. 220 N.Y. 259. 115 N.E. 916 (1917).
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exercise judicial power over a foreign corporation. In Davis v
Farmers' Co-op Equity Co.,0 a Kansas plaintiff sued a railroad
corporation in a Minnesota court for a cause of action arising in
Kansas. The railroad had an agent in Minnesota only for the pur-
pose of soliciting business. The Supreme Court held that the exercise
of jurisdiction over the defendant would be unconstitutional because
it imposed a burden on interstate commerce.7
In International Shoe Co. v State of Washington," the Supreme
Court allowed a state court to maintain personal jurisdiction over
a foreign corporation when the only contacts the corporation had
with the state were salesmen, who resided in the state, exhibiting
samples and soliciting orders that were to be accepted or rejected
by the corporation at a point outside the state. The court held
that "due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant
to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the terri-
tory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts which is such
that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice." 9
In International Shoe the Supreme Court rejected the consent
and presence theories and instituted a test that looked to the degree
or extent of doing business. 0 The Court intimated that regular
solicitation was enough to hold a foreign corporation amenable to
service, but rested its opinion on a solicitation-plus theory, in that
the Court looked to systematic and continuous business operation by
the appellant in Washington.
After International Shoe the Supreme Court decided three other
cases explaining International Shoe and the due process concept in-
volved in acquiring jurisdiction over foreign corporations, on the
basis of their acts in the forum state.
In Perkins v Benquet Consolidated Mining Co.," the Supreme
Court expanded the decision of International Shoe to encompass a
situation in which the cause of action arose from activities entirely
distant from the corporation's activities in Ohio, the forum state.
In Perkins, the foreign corporation owned no mining property in
Ohio. Its mines were located in the Philippine Islands, which at
the time of trial were occupied by the Japanese. During this period
Benquet carried on in Ohio a continuous and systematic, but limited
part of its buisness, which consisted of directors' meetings and
6. 262 U.S. 312 (1923).
7. Farner, Suits Against Foreign Corporations as a Burden on Interstate Commerce,
17 MINN. L. REv. 381 (1933).
8. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
9. Id. at 316.
10. Id. at 319-320.
11. 342 US. 437 (1952).
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business correspondence, banking, stock transfers, payment of sal-
aries, purchasing of machinery, etc. While so engaged, its president
was served with summons in an action in personam against the
corporation filed in an Ohio State Court, by a nonresident of Ohio.
The cause of action did not arise in Ohio and did not relate to
the corporation's activity there. The Supreme Court said, "The
amount and kind of activities which must be carried on by the
foreign corporation in the state of the forum so as to make it
reasonable and just to subject the corporation to the jurisdiction
of the state are to be determined in each case. ' 12 The court then
referred to Internatonal Shoe, and said, "Thus he carried on in
Ohio a continuous and systematic supervision of the necessarily
limited wartime activities of the company . under the circum-
stances above recited, it would not violate federal due process for
Ohio either to take or decline jurisdiction of the corporation m this
proceeding."' 3
Even though this case is somewhat weakened by the fact that
it is a "war" case, in that the other situs of trial would have been
the Philippine Islands, which at the time of trial were under Japan-
ese control, in the cases studied not one has refused to apply
Benquet for this reason, when states, other than the forum state,
could have taken jurisdiction over the cause of action.
McGee v International Life Insurance Co. ,'4 involved a true
single act situation. An Arizona insurance company, whose obliga-
tions were later taken over by defendant, sold a policy to a
California resident. The defendant contacted the insured, offering
to reinsure him with their company Neither insurance company
had any other contact with California. Under a California statute
subjecting foreign corporations to suit m California on insurance
contacts with residents of California, even though the corporation
could not be served with process within the state, the plaintiff
(beneficiary) sued defendant and obtained judgment in a California
court. The Supreme Court after citing International Shoe, form-
ulated the "national common market" theory,15 and said:
It is sufficient for purposes of due process that the suit was
based on a contract which had substantial connection with
that state. . It cannot be denied that California has a
manifest interest in providing effective means of redress for
12. Id. at 437.
13. Id. at 448.
14. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
15. Id. at 222-224. The "national common market" theory is basically that modern
transportation is so efficient and modern business is. conducted on a nation-wide scale, so
there is no reason why a company that operates with such conveniences should not defend
where its goods are sold or do damage.
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There have been cases that restrict the holding in McGee to
its residents when their insurers refuse to pay claims. These
residents would be at a severe disadvantage if they were
forced to follow the insurance company to a distant state
in order to hold it legally accountable.' 6
There have been cases that restrict the holding in McGee to
insurance cases,17 but most of the cases have refused to distinguish
between insurance and other types of contracts. 18
The broad decisions in the past cases were qualified in Hanson
v Denckla.19 Here the Supreme Court of Florida sustained a ruling
that gave Florida personal jurisdiction over a Delaware trust com-
pany on the following facts. While domiciled in Pennsylvania, a
woman executed in Delaware a revocable deed of trust making a
Delaware trust company trustee of certain securities, reserving an
income for life and providing that the remainder should be paid
to such parties as she should appoint by inter vivos or testamentary
power. Later the woman moved to Florida, where she exercised
the powers of appointment. The Florida state courts ruled on the
substantive question of the trust and appointment, and also claimed
that Florida had jurisdiction over the trust company
In denying the Florida courts' jurisdiction, The Supreme Court
affirmed the minimal contact theory put forth in International Shoe,
but qualified the general language of McGee relating to the "national
common market" theory It based the qualification on the fact
that the trust company had not physically gone into Florida to do
business. The Court felt that as far as personal jurisdiction is con-
cerned, state borders have not totally dissolved.20  The test in
Hanson, which required that there be some contractual contact that
directly connects the defendant with the forum state, has been
broadened to include a situation in which a manufacturer was held
amenable to suit in a foreign jurisdiction, when the product manu-
factured had been sold three times and integrated into a larger
piece of machinery before reaching the forum state. 21
These four cases are used as the interpretive guides in con-
strumg Single Act statutes. These statutes allow a state to take
personal jurisdiction over foreign corporations for acts done or con-
tracts made that touch or concern the state.
The constitutionality of these acts has been approved by the
16. Ibid.
17. E.g. Mueller v. Steelcase, Inc., 172 F. Supp. 416 (D. Minn. 1959).
18. Belcher v. Anderson Tully, 252 F Supp. 631 (E.D. Wis. 1966).
19. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
20. Id. at 251.
21. Ehlers v. U.S. Heating & Cooling Manufacturing Corp., 267 Minn. 56, 124 N.W.2d
824 (1963).
NOTES 303
Supreme Court, as shown by the previous cases. The true problem
concerning these acts is the application of the statutes to the fact
situations that arise, and the construction of these statutes by the
various courts in which they are intrepreted.
ILLINOIS
The constitutionality of the Illinois statute22 was upheld by the
Illinois court, not on the basis of the defendants implied consent,
but because of "the legitimate interest of the State in providing
redress in its courts against persons who, having substantial con-
tacts with the State, incur obligations to those entitled to the
States protection. ' 23 The court said that this statute "reflects a
conscious purpose to assert jurisdiction over nonresident defendants
to the extent permitted by the due process clause.
'
"24
Since the Illinois "Single Act" statute was enacted, the Illinois
courts are not limited by the theory that mere solicitation is not
doing business, 25 because the statute cannot be given a restrictive
interpretation based on the old Illinois "doing business" cases.
28
Moreover, the statute has been applied to causes of action that
arose prior to its effective date.
27
In Grobark v Addo Machine Co., 28 the court held that a non-
resident's acceptance of orders outside the state and shipping the
ordered goods into Illinois, did not confer jurisdiction over a claim
by the buyer for breach of a distribution contract under which the
goods were sold. Grobark was explained m Saletka v Willys Motors9
2
Inc.,29 where the court said, "the performance of jurisdictional
acts by the defendant or its agents while physically present in
Illinois is essential under the transaction of business clause of
section 17 "30 Grobark actually met the test put forth in Saletko
22. ILL. RiV. STAT. ch. 110 § 17 (1956). The pertinent provisions are
"(1) Any person, whether on not a citizen or resident of this State, who in per-
son or through an agent does any of the acts hereinafter enumerated, thereby sub-
mits such person, and, if an individual, his personal representative, to the jurisdiction
of the courts of this State as to any cause of action arising from the doing of any
of such acts.
(a) The transaction of any business within this State.
(b) The commission of a tortious act within this State.
(3) Only causes of action arising from acts enumerated herein may be asserted
against a defendant in an action in which jurisdiction over him is based upon this
Section."
23. Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill.2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957).
24. Id. at 389, 143 N.E.2d at 679.
25. Booz v. T. & P R.R. Co., 250 Ill. 376, 95 N.E. 460- (1911).
26. Haas v. Francher, 156 F Supp. 564, (N.D. I. 1957).
27. Sunday v. Donovan, 16 Ill. App.2d 116, 147 N.E.2d 401 (1st Dist. 1958).
28. 18 Ill. App.2d 10, 151 N.E.2d 425 (1st Dist. 1958).
29. 36 Ill. App.2d 7, 183 N.E.2d (1962).
30. Ibid.
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because there had been negotiation in Illinois between the parties
involved that were related to the contract sued upon.
Grobark was also considered in Kropp Forge v Jawitz.3 '
There the defendant, a New York citizen, negotiated by mail with
the Illinois plaintiff for the purchase of machinery Defendant then
visited the plaintiff in Illinois to inspect the machinery he was to
purchase. The court held that Illinois had jurisdiction under sec-
tion 17 (1) (a) by reason of "either the making of the alleged
contract itself, or the activity in furtherance of it, while defendant
was physically present in Illinois." s2 The Grobarkss case was
treated as holding "that the performance of jurisdictional acts by a
nonresident or his agent, while physically present in Illinois, is
essential for submission to the courts of this state under section
17 (1) (a) "84
In National Gas Appliance Corp. v A B Electrolux,85 the
defendant, a Swedish corporation, contracted to sell cooling units
to the plaintiff, who was using the units as components in a finished
product. The contract consisted of a letter mailed by the defendant
from Sweden and a telegram of acceptance sent by the plaintiff
from Chicago. Prior to the making of the contract, representatives
of the defendant made two visits to Illinois that were related to and
led to the making of the contract. The court held that "these acts
of defendant's representatives, which occurred in Illinois constitute
at least such minimal contacts with the state that the maintenance
of this suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice,"38 and that the disrict court had jurisdiction
under section 17 (1) (a)
The result of Kropp Forge3 7 and National Gas Appliance,38 is
that Grobark39 is in effect overruled as a precedent for denying
jurisdiction and can only be safely cited for the construction given
to it in Kropp Forge.
4 0
In LurLe v Rupe4 ' the court held, that where a corporation
maintained an agent in Illlinois for many years and the agent also
worked as an agent for a voting trust, both the corporation and the
trustee were amenable to suit under section 17 (1) (a). The fact
31. 37 Ill. App.2d 475, 186 N.E.2d 76 (1st Dist. 1962).
32. Id. at 481, 186 N.E.2d at 79.
33. Supra note 28.
34. Supra note 32.
35. 270 F.2d 472 (7th Cir. 1959).
36. Id. at 475.
37. Supra note 31.
38. Supra note 35.
39. 18 Ill. App.2d 10, 151 N.E.2d 425 (1st Dist. 1958).
40. Supra note 32.
41. 51 fli. App.2d 164, 201 N.E.2d 158 (1964).
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that the nonresident trustee of the trust had done no acts in Illinois
was held to be immaterial.
In Koplin v Saul Lerner Co., Inc.42 the court held that adver-
tising did not constitute doing business for the purposes of section
17 The court said, "the advertisements indicate the desire and hope
for doing business, but none of these denote that business was done.
A willingness to do business and solicitation of business do not con-
stitute the doing of business."3
In Orton v Woods Oil and Gas Co., 4 there is an excellent
discussion of section 17 Jurisdiction was denied under 17 (1) (a)
when the defendant had hired the plaintiffs, a lawyer and an en-
gineer who were both Illinois residents, to incorporate a Delaware
corporation and list the stock with the Security Exchange Commis-
sion. The court said the defendant did not have sufficient mini-
mal contacts with Illinois as required by the due process clause,
and refused the plaintiffs' argument that they were hired as agents
of the defendant, even when they were listed as such, and said they
were working for themselves. 5
In Kaye-Martin v Brooks" the court took a very questionable
view of section 17 (3) It took the view that subsection (3) limited
section 17 to apply only to cases arising solely from acts performed
within Illinois. 4 7 Subsection (3) relates to counterclaims, and it was
not the purpose of subsection (3) to limit the assertion of juris-
diction to cases in which every element of the transaction occurs
in Illinois. Jurisdiction exists under section 17 even though only
some of the events occurred in Illinois, if those events meet the
minimum contact-due process tests.4
Magnaflux v Foerster9 and Nortown Steel Supply Co. v
Northern Indiana Steel Supply Co.,50 are two cases where juris-
diction was maintained, but they involved cases of very substantial
contacts by the defendants in Illinois, including their having entered
into contracts with Illinois residents in Illinois, and having agents
in the state.
In Trippe Manufacturing v Spencer Gifts,' the court held that
the defendant's sending catalogs into Illinois was not transacting
42. 52 Ill. App.2d 97, 201 N.E.2d 763 (1964).
43. Id. at 97, 201 N.E.2d at 767.
44. 249 F.2d 198 (7th Cir. 1957).
45. Accord, E Film Corp. v. United Features Syndicate, 172 F Supp. 277 (N.D.I1l.
1959), Morgan v. Heckle, 171 F Supp. 482 (E.D.Ill. 1958), Bonan v. Leach, 22 F.R.D. 117
(E.D.I1. 1957).
46. 267 F.2d 394 (7th Cir. 1959).
47. Id. at 397.
48. Nelson v. Miller, 11 Iil.2d at 289, 143 N.E.2d at 679.
49. 223 F Supp. 552 (N.D.I1L. 1963).
50. 340 F.2d, 934 (7th Cir. 1965).
51. 270 F.2d 121 (7th Cir. 1959).
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business and this contact was insufficient to confer jurisdiction under
section 17 The court relied heavily on Grobark52 and also refused
to accept jurisdiction on a tort ground. 5
The court in Trippe5 4 said that the decision in Hanson 5 limited
McGee56 to the insurance field. This is a misreading of Hanson.
The court in Hanson applied the theory of minimum contacts" to
the facts before them. In Hanson the Supreme Court mentioned
the insurance aspect of McGee only after mentioning the substantial
connection the defendant had with the forum state. It is the general
opinion that the reasoning in McGee will and should be considered
in the construction of section 17 and similar statutes, in its juris-
dictional meaning and not as a decision limited to insurance law"
It would seem the federal courts in Illinois would prefer Kropp
Forge59 to Grobark,6 0 because it is the way in which the State
prefers its statute to be construed, and the federal courts would be
construing state law Also, the courts realize the modern trend
towards the relaxation of due process in this area.
In Hellriegel v Sears Roebuck and Co., 61 a case in which an
out-of-state manufacturer sold his product outside of Illinois to
another who then brought the product into Illinois and sold it to an
Illinois resident who was injured by the product. The court held
that since all of the defendants' acts concerning the product oc-
curred outside of Illinois, the defendant had not committed any
tortious act in Illinois. The court here relied on an English case
62
which reached a similar result construing an English statute63 that
provided for foreign service "whenever the action is founded on a
tort committed within the jurisdiction." Helilreigel was followed in
Trippes4 and Insul65 , and the same result was brought about in
Wing v Challenge Machine Co., 66 which relied heavily on Grobark.
6 7
52. 18 Ill. App.2d 10, 151 N.E.2d 425 (1st Dist. 1958).
53. In Trippe, the plaintiff tried to get jurisdiction under both subsection (1)
(a) and (b). The tort claim being based on false advertising. Other cases in-
voling both the tort and contract subsections of section 17 are. Insull v. New
York World Telegram, 273 F.2d 166 (7th Cir. 1959), and National Gas Appliance
Corp. v. A B Electrolux, 270 F.2d 472 (7th Cir. 1959).
54. Supra note 51.
55. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
56. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
57. Supra note 55, at 251.
58. III. REV. STAT. ch. 110 § 17 (Supp. 1965).
59. 37 Ill. App.2d 475, 186 N.E.2d 76 (1st Dist. 1962).
60 Supra note 52.
61. 157 F Supp. 718 (N.D.Ill. 1957).
62. George Monroe, Ltd. v. American Cyanamid [1944] 1 7.. 432.
63. Order XI, Rule 1 (ee) of The Rules of the Supreme Court (Annual Practice 1957).
64. 270 F.2d 821 (7th Cir. 1959).
65. 273 F.2d 166 (7th Cir. 1959).
66. 23 F.R.D. 669 (S.D.Ill. 1959).
67. 18 Iii. App.2d 10, 151 N.E.2d 425 (1st Dist. 1958). Compare, N. C. GEN. STAT. 355-
145 (a) (3) (1965).
(a) Every foreign corporation shall be subject to suit in this state,
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The Illinois Supreme Court considered the same problem as con-
sidered in Hellriege168 in Gray v American Radiator and Standard
Sanitary Corp. s9 The court held that assuming the valve to be
defective, as alleged, the valve manufacturer had committed a
tortious act in Illinois, within the meaning of section 17 (1) (b)
The court reasoned that since the last event, the failure of the valve
and the resulting injury to the plaintiff, that was necessary to render
the manufacturer liable happened in Illinois, a tortious act was
committed in Illinois. The argument that the term "tortious act"
referred to the acts or conduct of the defendant, rather than the
consequences of the defendant's acts that result in injury in Illinois
was rejected. 70
The court then discussed International Shoe 71 and due process,
and concluded "the requirements for jurisdiction have been further
relaxed so that at the present time it is sufficient if the act or
transaction itself has a substantial connection with the state of the
forum. ' 72 The court also recognized that there could be some cir-
cumstances in which it would be unfair to require a defendant to
defend in a distant state even though he had some contact with that
state. 73 The court then noted that the defendant manufacturer did
not claim the use of its product, giving rise to this cause of action,
was an isolated incident, and commented that it was reasonable to
infer that the defendant's sales resulted in substantial use and con-
sumption of its product in Illinois, and that it had undoubtedly bene-
fited from the protection that Illinois law has given to the marketing
of hot water heaters containing its valves.7 4 The court went on
to say-
[W]here the alleged liability arises, as in this case, from
the manufacture of products presumably sold in contempla-
tion of use here, it should not matter that the purchase was
made from an independent middleman or that someone other
than the defendant shipped the product into the state.
With the increasing specialization of commercial activity
whether or not such foreign corporation Is transacting or has transacted business
in this state and whether or not it is engaged exclusively in interstate or foreign
commerce, on any cause of action arising as follows:
(3) Out of the prodution, manufacture, or distribution of goods by such corporation
with the reasonable expectation that those goods are to be used or consumed in this
state and are so used and consumed, regardless of how or where the goods were produced,
manufactured, marketed, or sold or whether or not through the medium of independent
contractors or dealers;"
68. Supra note 61.
69. 22 111.2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
70. Id. at 434-435, 176 N.E.2d at 762.
71. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
72. Supra note 69, at 438, 176 N.E.2d at 764.
73. Id. at 441, 176 N.E.2d at 766.
74. Ibid.
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and the growing interdependence of business enterprises it
is seldom that a manufacturer deals directly with consumers
in other states. The fact that the benefit he derives from
its laws is an indirect one, however, does not make it any
the less essential to the conduct of his business; and it is
not unreasonable where a cause of action arises from alleged
defects in his product, to say that the use of such products
in the ordinary course of commerce is sufficient contact
with this state as to justify a requirement that he defend
here.
75
As a general proposition, if a corporation elects to sell
its products for ultimate use in another state, it is not
unjust to hold it answerable there for any damage caused
by defects in those products. Advanced means of distribution
and other commercial activity have made possible these
modern methods of doing business, and have largely effaced
the economic significance of state lines. By the same token,
today's facilities for transporation and communication have
removed much of the difficulty and inconvenience formerly
encountered in defending lawsuits brought m other states.
7
0
The two decisions in federal courts denying jurisdiction in cases
of tort injury in Illinois from activities outside the state, Trippe
7
and InsullT s did not involve injury due to defective manufacture.
Trippe involved a suit for unfair competition, in which catalogs
containing false information were mailed into the state; Insull was
a case concerning libel in newspapers that were mailed into Illinois.
Gray79 seems to doom Trippe, but Insull is probably good law be-
cause of the Illinois view of what constitutes libel.
In Keckler v Brookwood Country Club,0 the defendant moved
to quash service of process under section 17 (1) (b) The defendant
manufactured a golf cart in Indiana and sold it to another company
that delivered the cart to Illinois, where the cart tipped and in-
jured the plaintiff. The court quoted from Hanson v Denckla,1
"It is essential in each case that there be some act by which the
defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting
activities within the forum State, and invoking the benefits and
protection of its law "812 Here as in Gray8 the defendant had never
75. Test of whether activities of a non-resident are sufficient to subject him to
jurisdiction of Illinois courts is the substance of the acts rather than the quantity of acts
done. Kropp Forge v. Jawitz, 37 II. App.2d 475, 186 N.E.2d 76 (1st Dist. 1962).
76. Supra note 73.
77. 270 F.2d 821 (7th Cir. 1959).
78. 273 F.2d 166 (7th Cir. 1959).
79. Supra note 69.
80. 248 F Supp. 645 (N.D.IIL 1965).
81. 357 U.S. 285 (1958).
82. 1d. at 253.
83. 22 11.2d 482, 176 1q.E.2d 761 (1961).
physically entered Illinois. The court compared the two situations
and expressed approval of the Gray holding84 and said, "When a
manufacturer voluntarily chooses to sell his product in a way in
which it will be resold from dealer to dealer, transferred from hand
to hand and transported from state to state, he cannot reasonably
claim that he is surprised at being held to answer in any state
for the damage the product causes."'85 It would seem that after
taking this liberal position the court would allow jurisdiction to
stand, but it did not. It went on to say that entering the manu-
facturing business is not enough to subject a person to personal
jurisdiction under a Single Act statute. The court required that the
plaintiff prove that the defendant's distribution pattern is of a kind
from which a reasonable inference may be drawn that the national
channels of commerce have been chosen by the manufacturer 88
This requirement seems to be an excuse rather than a reason for
denying jurisdiction, especially when the manufacturer sells to a
wholesaler, and when Indiana and Illinois border on each other and
have interlocking economies. It seems to be putting an unreason-
able burden on the plaintiff, especially if the manufacturer chose
to sell to wholesalers in his own state.
The language of section 17 (1) (a) and (b) is flexible enough to
cover a single act in its jurisdictional context, although it is sus-
ceptible to the construction given to it in Grobark87 and Hellnregel. s
There is no doubt that an Illinois state court would sustain urs-
diction over a single act, 9 but a federal court sitting in Illinois
would probably not do so,90 since they take the due process clause
more seriously than they do a citizen's right to sue in his own state.
But this does not pose that many problems. The states having
Single Act statutes go through a period of adjustment where the
statute is at first narrowly construed, then as the courts get used
to "handling" the statute, they give it a more liberal construction.
This will also appear when the Wisconsin and Minnesota statutes
are considered.
The concept of forum non conveniens is considered in Illinois
under both the tort9' and contract 92 subsections of section 17.
Forum non conveniens will be discussed with the Wisconsin ma-
84. Id. at 441, 176 N.E.2d at 766.
85. Supra note 80, at 649.
86. Id. at 650.
87. 18 I1. App.2d 10, 151 N.E.2d 425 (lst Dist. 1958).
88. 157 F.Supp. 718 (N.D.I1L 1957).
89. Nelson v. Miller, 11 1L2d at 389, 143 N.E.2d at 679, Kropp Forge v. Jawitz, 37
Ill. App.2d 475, 186 N.E.2d 76 (1st Dist. 1962).
90. Morgan v. Heckle, 171 F.Supp. 482 (E.D.Ill. 1959).
91. Gray v. American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 .Il.2d 432, 176 N.E.2d
761 (1961).
92. Nelson v. Miller, 11 I1.2d at 393, 143 N.E.2d at 681.
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terial, as Wisconsin has a statute relating to it and discusses the
cases from several jurisdictions.
WISCONSIN
The Wisconsin Single Act statute93 was construed in Huck v
Chicago St. P., M. and 0. Ry Co. 94 which involved a tort action
to recover for an injury that occurred in Wisconsin, resulting from
a defective hand brake on a railroad box car. Rock Island was
interpleaded as a defendant because it was the carrier that selected
the defective car in Illinois for use in shipping the cargo into
Wisconsin. The Rock Island, which operated over no track in Wis-
consin, continuously solicited freight and passenger business to be
routed over its lines outside Wisconsin from an office in Wisconsin.
The court said it had no hesitancy in holding that the objective of
the statute was to give citizens of Wisconsin the right to make use
93. Wis. STAT. 262.05 (Supp. 1966). The pertinent sections of this statute are. "A
court of this state having jurisdiction of the subject matter has jurisdiction over 'a person
served in an action pursuant to section 262.05 under any of the following circumstances:
(1) Local presence or status. In any action whether arising within or without this
state, against a defendant who when the action is commenced.
(d) Is engaged in substantial and not isolated activities within this state,
whether such activities are wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise.
(3) Local act or omission. In any action claiming injury to person or property
within or without this state arising out of an act or omission within this state by the
defendant.
(4) Local injury foreign act. In any action claiming injury to person or property
within this state arising out of an act or omission outside this state by the defendant
provided in additon that at the time of the injury either*
(a) Solicitation or service activities were carried on within this state by or
on behalf of the defendant, or
(b) Products, materials or things processed, serviced or manufactured by the
defendant were used or consumed within this state in the ordinary course of trade.
(5) Local services, goods or contracts. In any action which.
(a) Arises out of a promise, made anywhere to the plaintiff or to some
third party for the plaintiff's benefit, by the defendant to perform services within this
state or to pay for services to be performed in this state by the plaintiff* or
(b) Arises out of services actually performed for the plaintiff by the de-
fendant within this state, or services actually performed for the defendant by the plaintiff
within the state if such performance within this state was authorized or ratified by the
defendant, or
(c) Arises out of a promise, made anywhere to the plaintiff or to some
third party for the plamtiff's benefit, by the defendant, to deliver or receive within this
state or to ship from this state goods documents of title or other things of value, or
(d) Relates to goods, documents of title, or other things of value shipped
from this state by the plaintiff to the defendant on his order or direction, or
(e) Relates to goods, documents or title or other things of value received
by the plaintiff in this state from the defendant without regard to where delivery to
carrier occurred."
The above statute had a forerunner in Wisconsin, Wis. Stat. 262.09 (4), which read.
"(4) Foreign corporations, generally. If the defendant is a foreign corporation
(including one created by or under any act of congress) and
(a) is doing business in Wisconsin at the time of service, or
(b) the cause of action against it arose out of the doing business in Wis-
consin, service may be made in accordance with the provisions of 180.825 or by delivery
within or without the state a copy of the summons to any officer director or managing
agent of the corporation."
Both of the above statutes are considered Single Act statutes, and will be treated
together.
94. 3 Wis.2d 132, 90 N.W.2d 154 (1958).
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of the courts of Wisconsin in instituting causes of action against
foreign corporations which were carrying on business activities with-
in the state, subject only to such limitations as are imposed by
the Constitution.9 5 The court also said that the old cases defining
doing business are not applicable when this Single Act statute is
being construed.98 In Huck it is obvious that the Wisconsin Supreme
Court meant to give the statute the widest, most liberal construction
that is permissible under due process.9 7
In Hornstein v Atchinson, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry., 98 the
plaintiff brought suit in Wisconsin for injuries received while a pas-
senger on the defendant's line in Kansas. The defendant had no
tracks and carried no freight or passengers in Wisconsin, but did
maintain an office in Milwaukee for the solicitation of freight and
passenger business. The plaintiffs had purchased their tickets in
Wisconsin. The court cited Huck 9 and Lau'00 in holding that the
objective of the statute was to give Wisconsin residents the right
to make use of Wisconsin courts in bringing a cause of action
against a foreign corporation, which is actually carrying on bus-
iness in Wisconsin. The court distinguished an earlier case 10 ' where
the court held that the casual presence of a corporate agent or
even his conducting of single or isolated items of activities in a
state, on the corporation's behalf, is not sufficient minimal contacts
to subject the corporation to suit on causes of action arising from
activities unconnected with the activities of the corporation in Wis-
consin. In that case the corporation was not doing business in
Wisconsin, and the agent's purpose for being in Wisconsin was un-
related to the cause of action. In the case at bar, the agent was
not in Wisconsin for isolated purposes, he was there to solicit bus-
mess for the railway and this activity was directly related to the
plaintiff's injury, as the plaintiffs bought their tickets in Wisconsin.
The application of the statute to tort actions has been well
within the purpose for which the statute was enacted. It has neither
been too restrictive nor have the courts 'exceeded the bounds of
due process.
American Type Founders Co., Inc. v Mueller Collor Plate Co.102
involved a third party defendant, Elmora Corporation, that moved
to dismiss on the ground that the court did not have jurisdiction,
95. Id. at 137, 90 N.W.2d 154 (1958).
96. Ibid.
97. Lau v. Chicago & N.W Ry. Co., 14 Wis.2d 329, 111 N.W.2d 158 (1961).
98. 229 F.Supp. 1009 (W.D.Wis. 1964).
99. Supra note 94.
100. Supra note 97.
101. Mitchell v. Airline Reservations, Inc., 265 Wis. 313, 61 N.W.2d 496 (1953).
102. 171 F.Supp. 249 (F.D.Wis. 1959).
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because the plaintiff's cause of action did not arise out of its doing
business in Wisconsin. The court held that where Elmora had
solicited the contract in Wisconsin, shipped the goods into Wiscon-
sin, furnished help for the installation of the goods in Wisconsin,
and filed a conditional sales contract pertaining to the goods in
Wisconsin, it had sufficient minimal contacts to be amenable to
suit in Wisconsin. In doing so, the court reiterated what the purpose
of the statute was, and went on to mention International Shoe m
holding that Elmora had a substantial connection with Wisconsin"'0
and that the due process test depends on the quality and nature of
the activity, rather than the quantity of acts done by the foreign
corporation. 1°4 The court also mentioned the "national common
market" theory put forth in McGee.10 5
The court in Koepp v Peters,0 6 held that the defendant, a Mich-
igan corporation, was amenable to process under the Single Act
statute, when it advertised its product in Wisconsin, owned property
in Wisconsin as a result of financing some of the sales of its
products through mortgages, and had a number of authorized
dealers in Wisconsin who were contacted by the defendants repre-
sentatives at regular intervals. The court cited American Type
Founders'0 7 and referred to the Supreme Court decisions mentioned
in that case. The court also mentioned that the defendant had
constructed a marketing system that resulted in the continuous sale
of its products in Wisconsin and that system had resulted in a long
established and well organized venture in Wisconsin.
Wisconsin Metal and Chemical Corp. v Dezurik Corporation, '°
involved a suit by a Wisconsin resident against a Minnesota corpor-
ation for breach of warranty with respect to valves purchases by
the plaintiff from the defendant. The court said that where the
defendant had authorized a Wisconsin company, Dorner, to solicit
orders for its products in Wisconsin and Dorner secured an order
from the plaintiff for the defendant's products, and the defendant
filled this order, due process was not denied the defendant as to
service under section 262.05. The court considered International
Shoe and McGee, and decided that the suit did not offend tradi-
tional notions of fair play and substantial justice; the defendant was
involved in a contract that had a substantial connection with the
state. The court said:
103. 326 U.S. at 316.
104. Id. at 319.
105. 355 U.S. at 222.
106. 193 F.Supp. 296 (E.D.Wis. 1961).
107. Supra note 102.
108. 222 F.Supp. 119 (E.D.Wis. 1963).
NOTES,
It is reasonable for a corporation that authorizes a manu-
facturer's representative to solicit orders for the sale of
its goods in the state and then delivers the product in Wis-
consin pursuant to such order to defend an action brought
by the buyer for breach of warranty arising out of such
sale. The due process clause is violated only (1) if the
state attempts to reach defendants who have had no mini-
mum contact with the state so that it would be unreasonable
and unfair to require them to respond to that state's process,
or, (2) if the method of notice to the defendant is not
adequate."°
The court then considered the Hanson v Denckla limitation 1 ° and
found that the defendant had availed itself of the privilege of con-
ducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits
and protection of its laws.'1 '
The defendant fought jurisdiction, relying on Grobark,"2 where
the court held there were insufficient minimal contacts. The court
dismissed the defendant's argument by saying that the court m
Grobark was dealing with the early legalistic definition of doing
business rather than the minimal contact concept established in
International Shoe"11 and McGee."4 The court found that section
262.05 is applicable to a true single act situation, without violating
the due process clause.
In Sun-X Glass Tinting of Mid-Wisconsin, Inc. v Sun-X Inter-
national Inc.," 5 the court held that a nonresident corporation which
had solicited and procured distributorship contracts in Wisconsin
had sufficient minimal contacts with Wisconsin to be amenable to
service in actions by resident plaintiffs, but that four causes of
action based on four separate contracts would be severed. The
court cited Huck," 6 Lau,-' and distinguished Holiday on Ice Shows
v Dancing Waters, Inc." 8 In Sun-X, various officers and managerial
personnel from the defendant company come into Wisconsin for the
purpose of negotiating and entering into various contracts. The
court distinguished the cases on the basis of the powers of the
109. Id. at 123.
110. 357 U.S. at 251.
111. Id. at 253.
112. 18 Ill. App.2d 10, 151 N.E.2d 425 (1st Dist. 1958).
113. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
114. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
115. 227 F.Supp. 365 (W.D.Wis. 1964).
116. 4 Wis.2d at 137-139, 90 N.W.2d at 157-158, 159.
117. 14 Wis.2d 329, 111 N.W.2d 158 (1961).
118. 155 F.Supp. 763 (W.D.WIs. 1957). Here, a contract was made in Illinois between
the Wisconsin plaintiff and a New York defendant, that provided the plaintiff was to
assemble the equipment in Wisconsin under the direction of an employee of the defendant,
and the machine was to be operated by one of the defendants mechanics. The court denied
Jurisdiction because no officer, agent, or director of the defendant entered Wisconsin.
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employees that entered Wisconsin. The mechanic in Holiday had no
contract making powers; the officers in Sun-X did.
The court then stated that it was sufficient for purposes of due
process that the action was based on a. contract which had a sub-
stantial connection with Wisconsin." 9
The four causes of action that were severed, were brought by
nonresidents of Wisconsin. The court cited Huck120 in restricting
the use of section 262.05 to Wisconsin residents. The court also
mentioned Mitchell12 1 which held that the casual presence of the
corporate agent or even his conducting of single or isolated items
of activities in the state on the corporation's behalf is not enough
to subject it to suit on causes of action unconnected with its ac-
tivities there. The four nonresident plaintiffs' causes of action are
apparently unconnected with Wisconsin and with the defendant's
activities undertaken in Wisconsin.
Jurisdiction was denied in Travelers Insurance Company v
George McArthur and Sons 2 2 over a Pennsylvania corporation on
the basis of situs of the contract through its sale of products to a
Wisconsin corporation, where the product did not come into Wis-
consin, but was sent from Pennsylvania to Connecticut. The court
said that section 262.05 contemplates a requirement for jurisdiction
similar to that of doing business within the state. Thus, the statute
requires not just an isolated contact, but substantial activities in
the state that are continuous and systematic.
The trial court felt this was a case in which jurisdiction could
be taken. It relied on section 262.05 (3), reasoning that this section
was applicable since the injury occurred outside the state as the
result of an act within the state by the defendant. The act within
the state was the defendants' entering into a contract in Wisconsin.
The appellate court found there was no evidence that this contract
was made in Wisconsin, nor was there evidence as to the defendants
performing any act in Wisconsin. Section 262.05 (1) (d) was also
used in attempting to get jurisdiction over the defendant, claiming
that the products were used in Wisconsin in the ordinary course
of trade. In denying jurisdiction the court cited Flambeau Plastics
Corporation v King Bee Manufacturing Company, 23 where the court
had indicated its doubt that a single act by the defendant, entering
into a single contract with a Wisconsin resident to be performed
119. Kappus v. Western Hills Oil, Inc., 24 F.R.D. 123 (E.D.Wls. 1959), Dettman v.
Nelson Tester Co., 275 Wis. 569, 83 N.W.2d 162 (1957).
120. Supra note 116.
121. 265 Wis. 313, 61 N.W.2d 469 (1953).
122. 25 Wis.2d 418, 130 N.W.2d 852 (1964).
123. 24 Wls.2d 459, 129 N.W.2d 237 (1964).
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in Wisconsin, would be sufficient contact with Wisconsin to subject
it to jurisdiction under section 262.05 (1) (d) The court in Flambeau
also claimed that to subject a foreign corporation to the jurisdiction
of Wisconsin courts under section 262.05, the complaint must allege
sufficient facts to establish jurisdiction.
The court shortly limited Flambeau to the extent that the court
will no longer base a determination of lack of personal jurisdiction
over a defendant upon the failure of the complaint to allege facts
necessary to establish personal jurisdiction.1
24
In Pavalon v Fishman,'25 after the court took jurisdiction over
the defendants in the previous case,' 26 Fishman moved for dismissal
on the grounds that jurisdiction as to him was in violation of due
process. Because there was no personal or property injury, juris-
diction was based on section 262.05 (5) (e) Under subsection (5)
there must be some degree of consensual privity between the plain-
tiff and defendant with respect to the, action brought, but "it is not
necessary that the defendant have done any act within the state;
the basis for personal jurisdiction is rather that the defendant has
entered some consensual agreement with the plaintiff which con-
templates a substantial contact in Wisconsin.' ' 27  Fishman called
Pavalon from Chicago to sell him stock, followed up the call by
sending Pavalon a prospectus, called a second time, and then sent
a letter to Pavalon instructing him to mail his check payable to
Sulray, the original name for the defendant in the previous case.
The defendant received a finders fee from Sulray for raising the
money in controversy Even though Sulray had no direct contact
with Wisconsin, the courts took jurisdiction, because Fishman was
acting as an agent for Sulray in this matter The ultimate issue
of jurisdiction depended on whether Fishman was an agent of Sulray
It was decided that Fishman was an agent of Sulray and, being
part of the transaction having such contacts with Wisconsin, was
amenable to suit.
In Belcher Corporation v Anderson Tully Co.,1 28 the plaintiff, a
Wisconsin corporation, sued the defendant, a Michigan corporation,
for damages arising out of defendant's alleged defective manufacture
of products it sold to the plaintiff. The defendant, in fighting juris-
diction, claimed that McGee.29 has been limited to the insurance
field by Denckla. 30 The court rejected this, claiming that it did not
124. Pavalon v. Thomas Holmes Corp., 25 Wis.2d 540, 131 N.W.2d 331 (1964).
125. 30 Wis.2d 459, 129 N.W.2d 237 (1964).
126. Supra note 124.
127. Supra note 123, at 464, 129 N.W.2d at 238.
128. 252 F.Supp. 631 (E.D.Wis. 1966).
129. 355 U.S. 20 (1957).
180. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
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see any difference in the state protecting its residents and allowing
them to bring suit in insurance cases, and allowing them a forum
for other types of contract cases.
On the facts of the case, the court found that as long as the
defendant had entered into approximately 50 contracts, in the normal
course of its profit making activities in the six years prior to the
commencement of the action, he had formed a consistent pattern
of business activity with a Wisconsin resident. The defendant had
established a substantial connection with Wisconsin, so due process
was not offended by the assumption of this suit m Wisconsin courts.
The treatment of section 262.05 and 262.09 (4) by the courts in
contract cases has, in general, been liberal and within constitutional
limitations. The federal courts have not been unduly restrictive in
construing this statute in the light of due process. 31 In fact, the
federal courts possibly would give the statute a more liberal read-
ing than would Wisconsin state courts. 3 2 Even so, Wisconsin courts
have not felt bound to some of the more conservative holdings and
have not hesitated in avoiding unwanted precedents.
3 3
Wisconsin has a statute 3 4 which embodies the principles of the
common law doctrine of forum non conveniens. Forum non con-
131. Belcher Corp. v. Anderson-Tully Co., 252 F.Supp. 631 (E.D.Wis. 1966), Wisconsin
Metal & Chemical Corporation v. DeZurik Corp., 222 F.Supp. 119 (E.D.Wis. 1963).
132. As to the application of the statute to single act situations, compare Flambeau
Plastics v. King Bee Mfg. Co., 24 Wls.2d 459, 129 N.W.2d 237 (1964), and Wisconsin
Metal & Chemical Corp. v. DeZurik Corp., 222 F.Supp. 119 (E.D.Wis. 1963).
133. See the treatment of Holiday on Ice Shows v. Dancing Waters, Inc., 155 F.Supp.
763 (W.D.Wis. 1957), in Sun-X Glass Tinting of Mid-Wisconsin, ,Inc. v. Sun-X Internation-
al, Inc., 227 F.Supp. 365 (W.D.Wis. 1964) and compare the holdings of Flambeau Plastics
v. King Bee Mfg. Co., 24 Wis.2d 459, 129 N.W.2d 237 (1964), and Pavalon v. Thomas
Holmes Corp., 25 Wis.2d 540, 131 N.W.2d 331 (1964).
134. WIs. STAT. 262.19 (Supp. 1966). The statute reads:
"(1) Stay on inititive of parties. If a court of this state, on motion of any party
finds that trial of an action pending before it should as a matter of substantial justice
be tried in a forum outside this state, the court may in conformity with sub. (3) enter
an order to stay further proceedings on the action In this state. A moving party under
this subsection must stipulate his consent to suit in the alternative forum and
waive his right to rely on statutes of limitation which may have run in the alternative
forum after commencement of the action in this xtate. A stay order nay be granted
although the action could not have been commenced in the alternative forum without con-
sent of the moving party.
(2) Time for filing and hearing motion the issues raised by this motion shall
be tried to the court in advance of any issue going to the merits of the action
(3) Scope of trial court discretion on motion to stay proceedings. The decision on
any timely motion to stay proceedings pursuant to sub. (1) Is within the discretion of the
court in which the action is pending. In the exercise of that discretion the court may
appropriately consider such factors as.
(a) Amenability to personal jurisdiction in this state and in any alternative
forum
(b) Convenience to the parties and witnesses of trial in this state and in
any alternative forum,
(c) Differences in conflict of law rules applicable in this state and in any
alternative forlm or
(d) Any other factors having substantial bearing upon the selection of a
convenient, reasonable and fair place of trial."
NOTES
vemens is recognized by Illinois,3 5 Wisconsin,' 8 and Minnesota,1 37
and it is applied in the federal courts. 3 8
The doctrine of forum non conveniens assumes that the plaintiff
could have brought his action in more than one state and any forum
the plaintiff selected has discretion to dismiss the action when it
appears that it may be tried more conveniently and justly m another
state.
The criteria for dismissing a case under the doctrine of forum
non conveniens have been subject to much discussion. Basically, it
is agreed, the doctrine applies only to exceptional situations, and
its object is to promote convenience and justice. Within these terms,
the trial court has much discretion in deciding when to apply the
doctrine and dismiss a. case, and appellate courts hesitate to inter-
fere with the exercise of the trial court's discretion, absent clear
abuse of this discretion, for fear that the doctrine may be converted
into a ground for appeal, delay, and inconvenience.
Exact standards for applying the doctrine have not yet been
formulated, but this is for the good. The flexible and equitable nature
of the doctrine make the formulation of precise standards difficult
and unwise when looked at m the light of the many factors that
may be involved in the decision. 139
The problem of forum non conveniens and the Single Act
statutes is fairly obvious. Even though a company has sold goods
in the state and the basic fact situation on which the claim is
founded subjects the company to the state's jurisdiction under the
Single Act statute, the company's proof of its non-negligence may
lie in its manufacturing process or some other function that is im-
ipossible to move to the forum state to offer into evidence. So a
Single Act statute without the companion qualification of forum non
conveniens is a possible tool of injustice.
The problem of too liberal usage of the doctrine would probably
not arise because it would be a rare court that would give up juris-
diction easily It would seem that courts would be most zealous in
protecting the interests of the citizens of the state m which they
sit, and it would be very unusual for a court to disclaim jurisdiction
of a fact situation over which it had power, without excellent reasons.
Forum non conveniens is not a doctrine by which the court
takes jurisdiction to decide if it has jurisdiction. The court decides
135. Gray v. American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill.2d 432, 176
N.E.2d 761 (1961).
136. Lau v. Chicago & N.W Ry. Co., 14 Wls.2d 329, 111 N.W.2d 158 (1961).
137. Fourth Northwestern National Bank of Mpls. v. HIlson, 264 Minn. 110, 117 N.W.2d
732 (1962).
138. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
139. Wis. STAT. 262.19 (Supp. 1966).
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jurisdiction when it takes the case; forum non conveniens is a
"formula" by which the court decides if the venue is correct. The
venue (forum non conveniens) question should be decided only after
the court has decided it has valid jurisdiction.
140
MINNESOTA
The Minnesota Single Act statute' 4' was construed in Mueller v
Steelcase,'42 where the nonresident defendant was not licensed to
do business and did not lease or own any property in Minnesota.
His contact with the state was a salesman who resided elsewhere,
but made occasional selling trips into the state. On one of these
trips the salesman sold one of defendant's chairs to a retailer, who
in turn, sold it to the plaintiff, who was injured when the chair
collapsed. The collapse and subsequent injury was allegedly caused
because of the faulty design and construction of a part that the
defendant obtained from another manufacturer. The court in this
case held that the defendant's contacts with Minnesota were too
scanty to subject it to jurisdiction. The court felt that to make the
defendant defend in Minnesota would not be in line with the "fair
play and substantial justice" concept of International Shoe.14 3 The
court also mentioned that the little business that the defendant did
in Minnesota gave rise to Michigan contracts.
This decision is unique in the light of the others that have been
studied. In this case the court, after discussing forum non conveniens,
resorts to a "parade of horrors" argument-"if jurisdiction were
sustained in this case, the door would be open to practically unlimited
jurisdiction over foreign corporations and the concept of the required
contacts and connections in this state to sustain jurisdiction would
be whittled away "'14 The fear of a court as to what will happen
in the future is not the best basis on which to decide a case. The
fact that in the future frivolous suits may arise under section 303.13
140. See the concurring opinion in Lau, supra note 136.
141. MINn. STAT. 303.13 (3) (Supp. 1965). The statute reads as follows: "Subdivision 1.
Foreign corporation. A foreign corporation shall be subject to service of process, as follows;
(3) If a foreign corporation makes a contract with a resident of Minnesota to
be performed in whole or in part by either party in Minnesota, or if such foreign
corporation commits a tort in whole or in part in Minnesota against a resident of
Minnesota, such acts shall be deemed equivalent to the appointment by the foreign
corporation of the secretary of the State of Minnesota and his successors to be its
true and lawful attorney upon whom may be served all lawful process in any actions
or proceedings against the foreign corporation arising from or growing out of such
contract or tort The making of the contract or the committing of the tort shall
be deemed to be the agreement of the foreign corporation that any process against
it which is so served upon the secretary of state shall be of the same legal force
and effect as if served personally within the State of Minnesota."
142. 172 F.Supp. 416 (D. Minn. 1959).
143. 326 U.S. at 316.
144. Supra note 142, at 419-420.
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(3) should not really concern the court in deciding a case before it
that involved actual damage; this was not an advisory opinion. But
in all fairness, it must be remembered that this case was decided
in 1959, when the concept of Single Act statutes had not reached
the state of development they have today
In Bard v Bemidji Bottle Gas Co., Inc.,'14 5 a nonresident plain-
tiff was injured as a result of a defective product sold by the de-
fendant. The defendant tried to join his supplier as a third party
defendant under section 303.13 (3) The court held that section
303.13 (3) did not apply to the supplier In construing the contract
section, "A contract to be performed in whole or in part in
Minnesota, '146 the court said that the supplier's agent had no author-
ity to enter into contracts, the gas was sold f. o.b. Tulsa, and de-
dendant's payment was to be sent to Fort Worth; thus, no part of
the contract was performed in Minnesota. The court did not seem
to recognize delivery of the goods as part of the contract. As to
the tort section of the statute, which reads, "commits a tort in whole
or in part in Minnesota against a resident of Minnesota,' '1 47 the court
said the only injuries were against nonresidents and the defendant
is only injured when his liability to the plaintiffs is established.
The court concluded that the defendant's action against his supplier
did not grow out of a, contract with the supplier or a tort against
itself, and that the defendant had not obtained jurisdiction over its
supplier by reason of section 303.13 (3)
In Atkins v J and L Steel Corporation,48 the plaintiff was in-
jured while transporting chemicals, because of an alleged defect in
the chemical containers caused by their manufacturer, the defendant.
The court held all defendants amenable to service. The court quoted
Beck v Spindler, 49 which held that due process requires that the
defendant, if he is not present within the territory of the forum, have
certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the
suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice. The court, after distinguishing away Mueller,150 said it
recognized the merits of protecting the rights of foreign corporations
not doing business in Minnesota, but felt that such considerations
were outweighed by the general objective of section 303.13 (3), which
is to permit a Minnesota resident injured in Minnesota by the wrong-
145. 23 F.R.D. 299 (D.Minn. 1969).
146. MINN. STAT. 303.13 (3) (1965).
147. Ibid.
148. 258 Minn. 571, 104 N.W.2d 888 (1960).
149. 256 Minn. 543, 99 N.W.2d 670 (1959).
150. Supra note 142.
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ful act of a foreign corporation to seek recompense in Minnesota
courts.
15 1
Hutchinson v Boyd and Sons Press Sales, Inc., 152 involved a
situation where the defendant, a foreign corporation, sold a punch
press to a Minnesota corporation at the request of another foreign
corporation. The press m question injured the plaintiff, and the
defendant was served under section 303.13 (3) The court, in up-
holding jurisdiction, said that all or one of the defendants may be
guilty of committing a tort m Minnesota. against a citizen, and thereby
constitute doing business as defined by section 303.13 (3), making
the defendant amenable and subject to service of process. The place
of wrong is where the injury occurs and if the allegations are es-
tablished by competent evidence, the defendants tortious conduct m
Minnesota amounts to doing business as to come within the juris-
diction of the court and law of the forum. 153 The court also men-
tioned that a single act, depending on the quality of the contacts,
may amount to doing business.
In Ewing, v Lockheed Aircraft Corporation,154 the cause of action
arose out of the crash of an Electra, manufactured by the defendant
and sold to Northwest Airlines, a Minnesota corporation. The crash
occurred in Indiana, and the plaintiff's decedent and plaintiff were
residents of South Dakota. Under the contract for sale, defendant
was to provide Northwest with a field service representative to aid
with problems that would arise with the Electras. Lockheed sold
approximately 18 Electras to Northwest at a price of 21/4 million
apiece. Lockheed had no contact with Minnesota except the contract
with Northwest and the field service representative stationed in
Minnesota, and the communication there must necessarily be be-
tween the field representative and the home office. The first problem
considered, was whether this situation was within section 303.13 (3)
The defendant claimed the statute restricted its benefits to Minnesota
residents and was applicable only to suits by one party against an-
other under contract, and concluded it could not apply here because
the decedent was not in privity of contact. The court said that be-
cause the Electra was sold to transport passengers, any warranty
would inure to the benefit of those who were expected to be carried
on the plane, so decedent was within the scope of the warranties.1 55
151. Contra, Pendzimas v. Eastern Metal Products Corp., 218 F.Supp. 524 (D.Minn.
1961).
152. 188 F.Supp 876 (D.Minn. 1960).
153. Id. at 878.
154. 202 F.Supp. 216 (D.Minn. 1962).
155. Compare Thiele Engineering Co. v. Weldon Farm Products, 224 F.Supp. 809 (1963).
where the plaintiff, after suffering a tort injury, sued under warranty theory. The court
held that lack of privity was enough to invoke due process and dismissed service of
process under section 303.13 (3).
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This case is within the spirit of the statute, in as far as it grows out
of a contract between Lockheed and Northwest, a Minnesota resi-
dent. There is no reason for concluding that this section of the
statute should not be applied to a nonresident; however, when Lock-
heed is amenable to suit by a resident, being that plaintiff's intestate
boarded the plane at the Minneapolis-St. Paul airport. If Lockheed
is doing business in this state within the purview of the statute and
is amenable to service in actions growing out of the contract in-
volving the Electras, there is no basis for the contention that juris-
diction should be limited to residents. The statute does not so
provide.15B
The court also considered whether there were sufficient minimal
contacts to satisfy due process. The court mentioned the sale of the
Electras, and Lockheed's field representative coming into Minnesota
as part of the contract, in holding that Lockheed had substantial
enough contacts in Minnesota to be amenable under section 303.13
(3) Also discussed was the problem that the contacts of Lockheed
with Minnesota did not give rise to the cause of action. The court
said section 303.13 (3) does not require that the cause of action
result from the foreign corporations activities in the state. If the
contract with Northwest is performed m whole or in part m Minne-
sota and the cause of action arises from it, in this case the con-
tract with its warranties, then jurisdiction that is consistent with
due process can be obtained. 157
It is an interesting sidelight that Bard, Mueller, and Pendzzmas,
were decided by the same court that decided Ewing. All four
cases involved tort injuries, but in Ewing the plaintiffs chose to sue
under a warranty theory rather than under tort. The court that
decided these cases seems to give the tort application of this sta-
tute an unduly restrictive construction, while being very liberal with
the contract application. It is not truly inconsistent treatment, but
it is certainly not uniform, when considered in the light of what the
statute was meant to accomplish.
Ehlers v U S. Heating and Cooling Manufacturing Corporation,1 58
also involved a warranty situation, in which jurisdiction was sus-
tained over a foreign corporation, when a product it had manufactur-
ed caused damage m Minnesota. No one connected with the manu-
facturer was involved in the installation of the product and there
were three sales of the product from the time of manufacture until
it reached the plaintiff. The defendant never had been licensed to
156. Supra note 154, at 219.
157. Id. at 219-220.
158. 267 Minn. 56, 124 N.W.2d 824 (1963),
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or transacted any business in Minnesota, owned no property, and
had no contract that relates in any way to Minnesota, in connection
with this product. The court quoted Hanson v Denckla,
15 9 "However
minimal the burden of defending in a foreign tribunal, a defendant
may not be called upon to do so unless he has had the minimal
contacts that are a prerequisite to its exercise of power over him,"
and went on to sustain service on the "national common market"
theory The product was manufactured for use by the general pub-
lic, and it was not claimed that the area of foreseeable use of the
product was so limited as to exclude Minnesota. The fact that such
a product would in the regular course of distribution be purchased
and used by a Minnesota buyer, would seem reasonably to be an-
ticipated by the manufacturer The court declined to say what it
would decide if the manufacturer were able to prove that the use
of his product, that is the sale of his product, in Minnesota were
unforeseeable.16 0
Williams v Connolly 6 , involved a situation in which a nonresident
plaintiff attempted to sue a resident motel owner and his nonresi-
dent supplier for injuries sustained by reason of an explosion, under
the warranty theory The court, after giving an excellent analysis
of the basic problems involved in the use of section 303.13 (3), denied
jurisdiction because there was no contract shown between the non-
resident defendant and a Minnesota resident although such a contract
is necessary to bring the action within the contract provisions of
section 303.13 (3), and since there was no contract, there was no
evidence from which an analysis of the contacts between the de-
fendant and Minnesota could be made.
United Barge Co. v Logan Charter Service, Inc.,1 2 was an
action to recover damages for losses suffered when a barge struck
a dam on the Mississippi and sank. The nonresident defendant,
who was towing the barge in question, had no offices or permanent
employees in Minnesota, but its tugs came to Minnesota several
times each year to perform towing contracts. The defendant claim-
ed that the plaintiffs were all foreign corporations also, and not
Minnesota residents. The court replied that the word resident should
be construed to allow the statute to fulfill its purposes and that
the plaintiffs would be considered residents of Minnesota because
of the extensive contacts they had with the state. The court felt
justified in reaching this conclusion because the Minnesota Supreme
159. 357 U.S. at 251.
160. Supra note 158, at 827. For opposite result see Dahlberg v. American Sound
Products, Inc. 179 F.Supp. 928 (D.Minn. 1959).
161. 227 F.Supp. 539 (1964).
162. 237 F.Supp. 624 (1964).
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Court has given section 303.13 (3) a broad interpretation and ap-
pears ready to take jurisdiction over any case in which Minnesota
had a reasonable interest in providing a remedy for the plaintiff.
6
The second objection by the defendant was not the standard
objection that jurisdiction in this case was violative of due process,
but that jurisdiction in this case would be an unreasonable burden
on interstate commerce. The court mentioned that this theory had
been rejected in International Milling Co. v Columbia Transporta-
tion Co., 6 4 and that in the light of Single Act statutes, there probably
is a concurrent easing of restrictions under interstate commerce as
is going on under the due process clause. The court also mentioned
that the burden on commerce argument had been presented to the
court in Ewing, which presented a much stronger case for dismissal,
and the court in that case did not even see fit to discuss it.1
65
Aftanase v Economy Boiler,6 6 involved a situation in which a
Minnesota resident sued a Michigan corporation, which had shipped
its machine directly into Minnesota without intermediate sales, for
injuries sustained while working at the machine. The defendant for
years had shipped, directly into Minnesota, its machines, brochures,
and replacement parts. The court felt it should treat the situation
as it thought the Minnesota Supreme Court would, and in the light
of that court's liberal interpretation and the federal relaxation of
the due process clause, the court felt that the use of section 303.13
(3) in this situation did not violate federal due process. The court
cited extensively from the state and federal decisions that inter-
preted section 303.13 (3) ,167 and from the Supreme Court decisions
that are the backbone of this whole concept of jurisdiction. 68 The
court said that Economy had sold for years in Minnesota, so there
was a large quantity and quality of contacts. 9 The machine was
powerful and contained potent possibilities of harm if negligently
designed or manufactured. The machine was shipped directly to the
user, so the defendant voluntarily placed his product on the Minne-
sota market, received protection from Minnesota law, and could
have anticipated that this activity would have consequences within
163. Id. at 628.
164. 292 U.S. 511 (1934).
165. Supra note 162, at 630.
166. 343 F.2d 187 (8th Cir. 1965).
168. Carlson v. Chatfield Machine Co., 288 F.Supp. 162 (D.Minn. 1964), where in a
situation similar to Aftanese, the court felt that the defendant's activity in Minnesota
was not of such little consequence as to avoid the liberal trend tword sustaining service,
McMenomy v. Wonder Building Corp., of America, 188 F.Supp. 213 (D.Mlinn. 1960), In
which service was sustained when the contract was executed in Minnesota and mailed to
Illinois, and the defendant's agents came to Minnesota to adjust claims and negotiate.
168. International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) Perkins v. Benquet Con-
solidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952), Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
169. See Beck v. Spindler, 256 Minn. 543, 99 N.W.2d 670 (1960).
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the state because it was sold into Minnesota for use there. The
court also said that Minnesota had an interest in providing a forum
for an injured resident, and in this situation the matter of forum
non conveniens is a small factor either way 170
In Haldeman-Homme Manufacturing Co. v Texecon Industries,
Inc.,17 the court held that jurisdiction over a foreign corporation
under section 303.13 (3) would be taken where the defendant entered
a contract to sell a business to a Minnesota corporation, and the
sale was made with knowledge that all assets and operations of
the business would be moved to Minnesota. The contract, notes,
and mortgage accompanying the sale would normally have required
enforcement in Minnesota. The only requirement of section 303.13
(3) is that some portion of the contract is to be performed in
Minnesota by either party The Minnesota Supreme Court has given
this requirement a broad interpretation, as in Paulos v Best
Securities,7 2 where the defendant's contacts with Minnesota were by
long distance phone and mail, and the plaintiff had paid for the
,shares sold by the defendant by mailing his check to New York.
The court indicated that the execution and the mailing of the check
would be enough to bring the transaction within section 303.13 (3)
In Haldeman the defendant sought protection of Minnesota courts
by the acceptance of a note, that was designed to be valid under
Minnesota law, and a chattel mortgage covering goods permanently
located in Minnesota. The court cited Williams v Connolly'13 and
brought the "national common market" into the context of section
303.13 (3) The court also mentioned that Minnesota might be per-
mitted to take jurisdiction over a nonresident on the basis of sub-
stantially fewer contacts with Minnesota when the plaintiff is an
individual, than would be required when the plaintiff is a corpora-
tion, since a corporation could more easily bear the burden of suing
in a foreign state. Here, the contacts of the defendant were sufficient
to allow Minnesota to take jurisdiction and to satisfy the due process
requirement of minimal contactsY.
7 4
In Kornfuhrer v Philadelphia Bindery, Inc.,175 where the non-
resident defendant accepted an order submitted by resident plaintiff,
and then attempted to cancel the contract, the court held there
were sufficient contacts to hold the defendant amenable to suit under
section 303.13 (3) Section 303.13 (3) requires only a portion of the
170. Supra note 166, at 197.
171. 236 F.Supp. 99 (D.Minn. 1964).
172 260 Minn. 283, 109 N.W.2d 576 (1961).
173. 227 F.Supp. at 547.
174. Supra note 171, at 102.
175. 240 F.Supp. 157 (D.Minn. 1965).
NoTEs
contract need be performed m Minnesota. In this case the plaintiff
would accept and pay for the goods in Minnesota, and the defendant
was to ship the goods into Minnesota. In finding the defendant had
sufficient minimal contacts to be amenable to jurisdiction, the court
quoted from the Restatement 2d, Conflict of Laws: 17 6 "It is reason-
able that a state should have judicial jurisdiction over an individual
as to causes of action arising from an act done for pecuniary profit,
having substantial consequences within the state, even though the act
is an isolated act not constituting the doing of business within the
state." The major loss to the plaintiff came from his inability to
meet resale agreements. This damage could be considered a sub-
stantial consequence within the state.
77
In McDermott v Bremson,'7 the defendant, a foreign corpora-
tion, sold a franchise to the plaintiff. The defendant sold five other
franchises to Minnesota residents, but they were not in question
here, and employed a Minnesota resident as a field agent. The
court ruled that the maintenance of this suit under section 303.13
(3) did not offend the traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice. 7 9 The court quoted extensively from Moore in determining
whether there were sufficient contacts to maintain jurisdiction. Since
the defendant's contact with Minnesota was sufficiently substantial
to relieve the plaintiff of approximately three thousand dollars, the
court felt that it was not unreasonable that the defendant assert
its defenses in Minnesota courts.
In Fourth Northwestern National Bank of Minneapolis v Hilson
Industries, Inc., 81 jurisdiction under section 303.13 (3) was refused
as to a nonresident buyer. Hilson wrote to three Minnesota firms
engaged m the manufacture of cooling boxes. Atland replied and
sent an officer to Hilson to discuss terms, which resulted in Hilson's
placing an order for fifty boxes with Atland. Prior to this time,
Hilson had no commercial contact with Minnesota. Hilson claimed
that soon after the boxes were installed serious defects occurred,
and they were obliged to spend large sums to have these defects
fixed. Because of this, Hilson withheld payments due Atland. The
notes being sued upon in this case were executed in Ohio by Hilson
to Atland, for the amount owed by Hilson to Atland, as a result
of a conference between the two companies. These notes were made
payable in Minnesota. Action was brought on these notes by use
of section 303.13 (3), and the defendant claimed this was in viola-
176. § 84, Comment c at 91 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1956).
177. Supra note 175, at 162.
178. 139 N.W.2d 809 (1966).
179. International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
180. 2 MooRE, PDERAu PRACTICE, 2d Ed., Paragraph 4.25 (5).
181. 264 Minn. 110, 117 N.W.2d 732 (1962).
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ton of due process. The court discussed International Shoe 82 and
the Hanson v Denckla'83 limitation. Also mentioned was that in
this case the defendant was a buyer, not a seller, and that there
is a distinction between suing a nonresident seller and a nonresident
buyer when the plaintiff is seeking to envoke section 303.13 (3) "The
general tendency of courts to require less in the way of sales activity
to bring a foreign corporation within the jurisdiction of a state has
not been accompanied by any parallel lessening of requirements as
to purchasing activities.'1 s4 The court relied heavily on the dif-
ference between selling products into Minnesota, and the purchasing
of products from Minnesota manufacturers. "It would seem short-
sighted indeed to discourage the sale of Minnesota products to non-
residents by subjecting buyers to our jurisdiction where the contacts
are so casual. The only connection with Minnesota is that the notes
are payable here.""'-' The court mentioned that even if section
303.13 (3) could be constitutionally applied, it would dismiss on the
grounds of forum non conveniens. The defendant was going to enter
a cooler into evidence that weighed several tons, and the court felt
it was impractical to move that to Minnesota for trial. Also Hilson
was planning to call witnesses from the states surrounding its home
state (Ohio) and being these witnesses were not under Hilson's con-
trol, it seemed only fair to encourage their attendance by having
the trial in a forum more convenient for them than Minnesota. Atland
did not have the same proof problems as did Hilson.
Hilson mentioned Dahlberg v Western Hearing Aid Center,
Ltd.,8 6 where a nonresident buyer had been held amenable to suit
under section 303.13 (3) Western had very substantial contacts with
Minnesota, in that the contract sued on was executed there, several
meetings were held in Minnesota between Dahlberg and Western,
and there were extensive business dealings in Minnesota in relation
to the contract sued upon as to advertising and promotion. In
Hilson the only contacts that Hilson had were the initial solicitation
and the designation of Minnesota as the place where the notes were
payable. The court in Hilson pointed out that Hilson had not re-
ceived any benefits or protection of Minnesota law'8 7 and dismissed
the only significant contact, that of the notes being payable in
Minnesota: "Fixing the place of payment at the plaintiff's business
residence is hardly the kind of commercial benefit to defendant that
182. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
183. 357 U.S. at 251.
184. Waltham Precision Inst. Co. v. McDonnell Aircraft Corp., 203 F.Supp. 539, 541
(D.Mass. 1962).
185. Supra note 181, at 736.
186. 259 Minn. 330, 101 N.W.2d 381 (1961).
187. Supra note 181, at 734-735.
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must be balanced by a countervailing capitulation to jurisdiction." ' s
Regardless of the wording of the various long arm statutes, the
courts all seem to reach similar results in construing them. There
are the conservative holdings, as in Mueller,189 Grobark,190 and
and Travelers Insurance,91 and the liberal, as in Kornfuhrer, 19 2 Bel-
Belcher 93 and Gray 194 The two guiding principles that seem to be the
basic idea behind the statutes are that foreign corporations should de-
fend where they are involved in legal problems, and the individual
court's interpretation of the landmark Supreme Court cases.
The big difference in the statutes is the language restricting their
use to certain persons or situations. The Illinois statute 95 is general
in its terms and does not limit its use to Illinois residents. It re-
quires that the defendant do any business or commit any tortious
act in Illinois. This criteria has been given a very liberal construc-
tion in tort situations, 196 but in contract situations it seems to be a
requirement to obtain service on the defendant that he be present
in the state in his corporate capacity, that is, he be physically pre-
sent in the state, and do jurisdictional acts, namely, acts in further-
ance of the contract. 97 While the extension of this statute to a single
act situation has been refused,198 in the light of a later acceptance
of the "national common market"' 99 theory, such refusal seems in-
consistent with the present interpretation of the statute in Illinois.
Morgan20 0 would seem to be weak precedent at this time.
The Wisconsin statute20 1 is also a general statute, and is quite
extensive in laying out the fact situations which it covers. But sub-
division (1) (d) restricts the use to cases involving substantial, not
isolated activity This seems to deny the test that activities, to sub-
ject a foreign corporation to jurisdiction under these statutes, be
based on the quality of the acts done in the forum, not mere
quantity 202 Even though the statute reads as it does, in Dezurik,23
the court said that a single act situation was within the purview of
the statute. This would seem to be the prevalent view, as American
188. Supra note 181, at 736.
189. 172 F.Supp. 416 (D.Minn. 1959).
190. 18 IlI.App.2d 10, 151 N.E.2d 425 (1st Dist. 1958).
191. 25 Wis.2d 418, 130 N.W.2d 852 (1964).
192. 240 F.Supp. 157 (D.Minn. 1965).
193. 252 F.Supp. 631 (E.D.Wis. 1966).
194. 22 II1.2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
195. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110 § 17 (Supp. 1965).
196. Gray v. American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp., supra note 196.
197. 270 F.2d 472 (7th Cir. 1959).
198. 171 F.Supp. 482 (E.D.I11. 1965).
199. 248 F.Supp. 645 (N.D.IIi. 1965).
200. Supra note 198.
201. WIS. STAT. 262.05 (Supp. 1966).
202. 326 U.S. at 319-320.
203. 222 F.Supp. 119 (E.D.Wis. 1963).
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Type Founders04 accepted the "national common market" theory
and Beleher'0 5 looked favorably on McGee,20 6 which was a single
act situation. In Travelers Insurance,'20 the court refused jurisdic-
tion because the goods the defendant sold never physically entered
the state, but later in Pavalon v Fishman20 the court said the de-
fendant need not act within the state. Since Pavalon is the latest
of the two cases, it would be controlling on this point. Sun-X, 229 re-
affirms Huck,210 in restricting the use of the statute to Wisconsin
residents. This restriction is judicial in nature, not statutory
Minnesota's statute2 l ' is broad in nature, and the only restrictions
as to suit, are that the action be founded on a contract with a
Minnesota resident, to be performed in whole or in part in Minne-
sota, or a tort in whole or in part against a Minnesota resident.
Ewing2" extended the concept of resident, when it allowed a non-
resident to make use of the statute when bringing an action for a
tort injury, under warranty contract theory Not only was the sta-
tute applied in favor of a nonresident, but privity was shown not
to be in favor with the court. The liberal attitude towards con-
struing who is a resident is also shown in United Barge. 213 The non-
adhering to the privity concept and the liberal attitude as to who
are residents are fortunate precedents to use in expanding this type
of statute to its fullest logical extent, under present business methods.
In early cases 21 4 the federal courts in Minnesota construed the
statute in a very conservative manner, but now both the state"35
and federal 216 courts recognize the liberal viewpoint when deciding
what is due process. Both courts allow jurisdiction in a single act
situation,21 but this has not always been so,218 thus, there is a con-
flict in the construction of the statute. The conservative cases have
not been specifically overruled, but in fact they are, as they are
studiously and obviously avoided.
Hilson,"2 9 may be a hard case, but it is an excellent case when
204. 171 F.Supp. 249 (E.D.Wis. 1959).
205. 252 F.Supp. 631 (E.D.Wis. 1966).
206. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
207. 25 Wis.2d 418, 130 N.W.2d 852 (1964).
208. 25 Wis.2d 540, 131 N.W.2d 331 (1964).
209. 227 F.Supp. 365 (W.D.Wis. 1964).
210. 4 Wis.2d 132, 90 N.W.2d 154 (1958).
211. MINN. STAT. 303.13 (3) (Supp. 1965).
212. 202 F.Supp. 216 (D.Minn. 1962).
213. 237 F.Supp. 624 (D.Minn. 1964).
214. Mueller v. Steelcase, 172 F.Supp. 416 (D.Minn. 1959) , Bard v. Bemidji Bottle Gas
Co., Inc., 23 F.IRD. 299 (1959).
215. Atkins v. J. and L. Steel Corp., 258 Minn. 571, 104 N.W.2d 888 (1960).
216. Hutchinson v. Boyd and Sons Press Sales, Inc., 188 F.SuPl 876 (D.Minn. 1960).
217. Ehlers v. U.S. Heating and Cooling Mfg. Corp., 267 Minn. 56, 124 N.W.2d 824
(1963), Kornfuehrer v. Philadelphia Bindery, Inc., 240 F.Supp. 157 (D.Minn. 1965).
218. Dahlberg v. American Sound Products, Inc. 179 F.Supp. 928 (D.Minn. 1959).
219. 264 Minn. 110, 117 N.W.2d 732 (1962).
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looking at the attitude of the Minnesota courts towards the statute.
It is obvious that the Minnesota courts have a realistic approach
to the whole concept involved and do not use the statute as whole-
sale license to take jurisdiction. They realize there are restrictions
and respect this fact. Hilson adds, rather than detracts, from the
construction given the statute by the Minnesota courts, especially
in the light of Dahlberg v Western Hearing Aid Center, Ltd.
2 20
North Dakota has no Single Act statute per se. What exists is
a section of the Business Corporation Act that relates to service of
process on foreign corporations.
2 21
This statute has never been construed, but it has all the quali-
fications of a Single Act statute. There must be contact with the
state, and the defendant is given, within reason, actual and not con-
structive notification. There is no reason why this statute cannot
be used as a Single Act statute, as long as the Supreme Court
tests are kept in mind. The fact that it is not designated as a
Single Act statute or that no qualifications are listed should not
militate against its use as such.
The fact that section 10-22-10 has not been construed as a Single
Act statute, may result from the conservative view that North
Dakota has towards "doing business" in the state. In Brevzck v
Cunard S. S. Co., 222 an agent of the defendant sold to plaintiff, a
North Dakota resident, a ticket to Norway The plaintiff claimed
that because of the defendant's agent's false representations he was
injured. (He never did get to Norway ) The court refused juris-
diction because the cause of action did not arise in North Dakota,
(plaintiff bought the ticket in North Dakota, but was stranded on the
west coast of Middle Europe) and the defendant owned no property
in the state. This case was decided under subdivision 6 of section
7426, Compiled Laws of 1913, which construed in section 28-0608 of
the North Dakota Revised Code of 1943, required the foreign corpor-
ation to hold property within the state, or that the cause of action
arise therein in order for jurisdiction to be sustained. In Wheeler
v Boyer Fire Apparatus Co., 223 where the defendant's agent had the
authority to solicit orders, which were forwarded to the defendant
for approval, the court held the defendant liable to service. Under
section 7426, the court held that a foreign corporation whose agent
220. 259 Minn. 330, 107 N.W.2d 381 (1961).
221. N.D. CENT. CODE 10-22-10 (1960). The statute reads as follows: "Whenever a
claim shall arise out of business transacted In this state by a foreign corporation trans-
without a certificate of authority, service of process may be made upon any person who
acting business without a certificate of authority, service of process may be made upon
any person who shall be found within this state acting as an agent of, or doing business
for, such corporation, or by mailing a copy thereof to the defendant corporation by re-
gistered or certified mail at its last known Post Office address,
222. 63 N.D. 212, 247 N.W. 373 (1933).
223. 63 N.D. 403, 248 X.W 621 (1938).
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systematically solicited sales contracts that resulted in a continuous
shipment of the corporation's products into North Dakota, is amen-
able to suit through its agent, where the cause of action arose in
North Dakota and the corporation had not designated the secre-
tary of state as attorney for service of process. In Ellsworth v
Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory, Inc., 224 the court held the defend-
ant amenable to service under section 7426, where the corporation
had extensive business dealings, and the cause of action arose in
the state.
In Asbury Hospital v Cass County,22 5 the court said that in order
for a foreign corporation to be doing business in the state, there
must be the doing of some works, or an exercise of some functions,
for which the corporation was created and not merely what the cor-
poration might have authority to do. The doing of an act that is with-
in the power of a corporation, but not a part of the business which
it is authorized to do, is not doing business.
In Anderson v Page and Hill Homes, Inc.,228 the defendant, a
Minnesota corporation, had a representative who traveled through
North and South Dakota for the purpose of establishing dealerships
for the defendant's product. What agreements the representative
made were subject to whatever action the home office chose to take
on them. The representative was paid from the Minnesota office
and the defendant had no other connection with Minnesota. The
plaintiff, a North Dakota resident, entered into an exclusive dealer-
ship contract with the defendant, then the defendant entered into
a dealership contract with another party The court refused to take
jurisdiction in this case, on the basis that the mere solicitation of
business within the state by a foreign corporation is not engaging
in business, and as the representative was merely soliciting, the
foreign corporation was not doing business as far as the statute is
concerned. The plaintiff put forth a forum non conveniens argument
which the court rejected, intimating that the argument would be
without force in any situation.
Not only has section 10-22-10 not been construed, but the courts
seem to have a very conservative attitude towards the subject al-
together If the North Dakota courts are not going to construe
section 10-22-10 as a Single Act -statute, then it is for the legislature
to enact one.
A Single Act statute is strictly in the interests of the residents
of the state. They are saved the inconvenience of going out of state
224. 65 N.D. 297, 258 N.W 486 (1935).
225. 72 N.D. 438, 7 N.W.2d 359 (1943).
226. 88 F.Supp. 408 (D.N.D. 1950).
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and suing corporations that have chosen, either by direct choice or
by putting their goods into the flow of national commerce, to use
North Dakota as a market for their goods. Defending suits in North
Dakota is a small price to pay for marketing goods in an area that
has a population in excess of a half million people. The fact that
there is such an extensive population would be incentive enough for
a foreign corporation to trade in North Dakota even if there were a
Single Act statute.
If section 10-22-10 does not suffice, North Dakota needs a Single
Act statute as a protective shield for its citizens. A statute such as
this should be flexible in nature and general in language. Where
the factors involved are so numerous, a statute should be termed
in general policy considerations, leaving the courts a large degree
of leeway in determining the applicability of the statute to the var-
ious fact situations as they arise. In such a statute the legislature
should make clear what areas it does not want to be included and
jurisdiction taken.
It would seem the ideal statute would include the following con-
siderations:
(1) The state should have sufficient interest in the case to
feel it is within due process to subject the defendant to
the law of the state.
(2) The defendant should have acted with such knowledge
that he could realize that his acts would have conse-
quences in the state. This would include the "national
common market" theory and the concept included in
North Carolina General Statutes 55-145 (a) (3) 227
(3) Although the interest of the resident plaintiff is foremost
in this type of statute, the defendant should be protected.
Provision should be made in the statute, as in the Illinois
statute,28 so that only causes of action connected with
the state will be tried. Joinder of causes of action
should not be encouraged when jurisdiction is obtained
under a Single Act statute.
(4) Above all, make clear the qualification that the statute
does not offend the concept of fair play and substantial
justice and that the statute will be coterminous with the
federal concept of due process.
If the state were to pass such a statute now, it would get the
227. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-145 (a) (3) (1965).
228. Ini. REv. STAT. ch. 110 § 17 (3) (1956).
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benefit of years of decisions on the subject and avoid the unfortunate
conservative construction that was given to Single Act statutes when
they first came into use.
ADLAI W. BRINK
